A Position on the "Honor Pledge" in 10 Points
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Subscribe to the channel, especially regarding the description of the desired state as a state of justice, law, and freedom, and considering the political and military decision as purely Syrian, and its stance towards the "State Group" in the context of its position towards regional and international parties.
This is while appreciating that the charter made the controls of the revolutionary work derived from the rulings of the noble religion, but the previous charter was clearer in the continuity of the principle of the sovereignty of the Sharia and the negation of ideas contrary to it in its articles.
We fully understand the severity of regional and international pressures seeking to tighten the noose on Islamic factions fighting in Syria. However, the blurring of the presentation is an entry point for a gradual retreat, especially for parties that have chosen to meet and cooperate with regional and international parties as stipulated in the charter.
No one should think that with our reservations here we do not appreciate the suffering of the people, nor should anyone exceed us in the concern to stop the bleeding; for we will never concede to you that accepting such a charter brings victory and stops the bleeding, but we see that negligence only increases victory but distance and problems complexity. It is not our call here to take the resolve for the sake of the Hereafter alone, but we want the continuity of God's companionship to achieve victory, stop suffering, and preserve the religion together.
As we mentioned earlier, the methodology of the "State Group" lacks immunity from infiltration due to its extremism, we see, on the other hand, that the problems of the charter are an entry point that threatens the methodological immunity of the groups signing it, and exposes them to the danger of entrapment and containment.
First of all, we must know the importance of charters to understand why we do not accept flaws in them; charters should be a straight line that judges their owners to themselves for fear of deviation over the long and difficult road and the multitude of callers at the gates of Hell, but their owners need to pledge to bind themselves to them constantly.
It is not appropriate to accept points of weakness and problems in the charter in trust of the leaders who sign it and their intention to establish the Sharia, and in trust of their ability to resist containment; for temptation does not guarantee safety, and they are not at the same level of methodological immunity. Then we witness campaigns of elimination or marginalization for them, and the occupation of those who are not just in their place to continue leading the train towards the unknown, after the leaders have legalized what facilitates deviation and thought that they would remain to prevent it.
Then the charters are binding literature for the second and third-tier leaders in the signing groups and all their soldiers, and these did not allow the circumstances of the Syrian revolution, which were imposed on its people hastily, to absorb the constants of some leaders; the existence of possibilities is a premise for the occurrence of methodological divergence in the layers of one group. For all of the above, it is not appropriate to infer the problems of the charters with the saying of Allah: {Except that you fear from them an injustice}, for these are charters and not a word that repels evil without deceiving the people.
If it is said that the purpose of the charter is to convey messages, we ask: messages to whom exactly?
If it is to all fighting factions, these are divided into three sections:
If the purpose of the charter is to convey messages to the outside world that is waiting and threatening to tighten the noose, it is known that this outside world waits for any sign of negligence to demand more; therefore, any evil from the outside world that the signatories of the charter avoid is expected to be replaced by an evil similar to it or worse by deepening the state of polarization and division in the Muslim ranks, and giving an excuse for extremism with such a charter.
If the charter, with its flaws, came in response to external pressures, then let the signatories declare clearly that the stage of unconditional support has ended and they should not rely on it afterward, and let our brothers at that time contemplate the jurisprudence of the saying of Allah: {That is because they said to those who hated what Allah has sent down, "We will obey you in some of the matter."}
If the charter only spoke of overthrowing the regime as a temporary common goal that accepts methodological divergence, we would be less reserved, and we would say that it does not contradict the first charter of the front, but its talk about the future form of the state in possible terms shows a concession in the clarity of the issue of the sovereignty of the Sharia in favor of gathering around the temporary goal, and here lies the danger.
For all of the above, we consider that the "Honor Charter" was a step backward; therefore, it is important to me here that my position is clearly understood regarding the Islamic Front and all the signatories of the charter, that I defend nothing but a clear methodology.
I had put my observations on the first charter hoping that the brothers would achieve a balance between alienating those who can be neutralized, and at the same time clarity in the issues where it is easy to err. But since we have taken a step back, I clarify clearly that this is not a methodology that I defend or bear its consequences.
At the same time, what I have published and will continue to publish, God willing, is the emphasis that these criticisms do not mean at all the sanctification of fighting the brothers in the groups that signed the charter as the extremists call; for the one who initiates has his rulings, but methodological problems are never a justification for fighting Muslims in such a Syrian condition where there is an infidel enemy attacking the religion and honor.
Just as we see the beginning of extremists fighting with their extremism as a deviation and distortion of the compass of conflict, we see the leniency in considering regional and international parties in solidarity with the plight of the Syrian people as a deviation; for the general regional and international parties are originally the ones with evil roles in inciting conflict between the "State Group" and other groups.
And the sanctification of opening up to dealing with these countries at the same time that fighting the "State Group" is declared as a legitimate goal is an entry point for them to further incite this conflict, which was not originally the goal of the jihad in Syria.
Then there is a loophole in the charter that leads to a dangerous situation; the charter called on the rest of the forces working on the Syrian ground to sign it so that everyone would be one hand in the effort to overthrow the regime, and these working forces include those known for their subservience to the outside and their non-objection to signing a charter with such possible terms. At the same time, the charter included fighting the "State Group" as a legitimate goal, did the signatory factions mean that they accept the help of the rest of the working forces - some of which are agents - against the regime while they will not seek their help against the "State Group"? Then if a fight occurs between the agent forces and the "State Group", will the factions that signed the charter remain in alliance with these forces?
The sixth clause of the covenant is an initiative to create a rift between the people of Syria and the virtuous migrants. Although it may intend to deter external threats, it causes greater harm by making the migrants feel unjustly treated, fostering resentment, and dividing the ranks.
The external parties are confused in their handling of the Syrian file. The steadfastness of the fighting groups and their resilience against threats of pressure and being placed on terrorism lists make it difficult for external parties to blackmail them. This may force them to retreat from their threats, as has happened repeatedly.
In conclusion, it is essential to remind that any setback our brothers face in the Syrian arena is primarily the responsibility of the nation. The Syrian revolution is an orphan that the nation has not adopted, and the scholars have fallen short in their duty. This has left the factions feeling isolated and lonely, leading to actions that many later criticize.
Scholars must advise and guide their brothers, bearing any harm that comes their way. O Allah, guide those who have signed the covenant to rectify their mistakes and return to what is better. Guide us to support all the fighters of Syria.
Peace be upon you and God's mercy.